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Abstract
There are increasing criticisms of dominant models for scaling up health systems in developing countries
and a recognition that approaches are needed that better take into account the complexity of health
interventions. Since Reform and Opening in the late 1970s, Chinese government has managed complex,
rapid and intersecting reforms across many policy areas. As with reforms in other policy areas, reform of
the health system has been through a process of trial and error. There is increasing understanding of the
importance of policy experimentation and innovation in many of China’s reforms; this article argues that
these processes have been important in rebuilding China’s health system. While China’s current system still
has many problems, progress is being made in developing a functioning system able to ensure broad
population access. The article analyses Chinese thinking on policy experimentation and innovation and their
use in management of complex reforms. It argues that China’s management of reform allows space for
policy tailoring and innovation by sub-national governments under a broad agreement over the ends of
reform, and that shared understandings of policy innovation, alongside informational infrastructures for the
systemic propagation and codification of useful practices, provide a framework for managing change in
complex environments and under conditions of uncertainty in which ‘what works’ is not knowable in
advance. The article situates China’s use of experimentation and innovation in management of health
system reform in relation to recent literature which applies complex systems thinking to global health, and
concludes that there are lessons to be learnt from China’s approaches to managing complexity in
development of health systems for the benefit of the poor.
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Background
Scale up of health interventions in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) is increasingly a priority
for development agencies and policy makers.
Attention to scale up responds to the need to expand
coverage of interventions targeting specific diseases,
roll out interventions addressing specific population
groups, and strengthen health systems in LMICs for
the achievement of broad health goals [1, 2]. One of
the most obvious attempts at global health scale up is the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Success of
many programmes, and success in reaching the health
MDGs, has been uneven [3]. This is increasing policy and
research attention to how health interventions can be
‘scaled up’ in LMICs. Recent research is shifting at-
tention from supposedly universally-applicable best
practices towards more context-sensitive implementa-
tion processes [4] and learning that can inform better
programming and scale up. Recent research has ar-
gued that health systems, especially in LMICs, should
be viewed as complex systems, and this has implica-
tions for how scale up can be achieved [5]. This
paper discusses the case of China. While China’s
health system remains a work in progress, substantial
progress has been made in developing health systems
with broad population coverage, addressing
communicable diseases, improving maternal and child
health and in meeting MDG targets. China is notableCorrespondence: lewishusain@gmail.com
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for discussions of scale up: substantial discretion in
policy implementation is encompassed within a nom-
inally unitary political system, and many reforms in-
corporate experimentation and innovation, which can
contribute to systemic learning and help inform pol-
icy development. This is part of a discernible Chinese
government ‘work style’ [6]. This paper argues that
this has advantages for scale up of health interven-
tions in a huge country in which reforms must be ap-
plicable across a wide range of places, under
conditions of complexity, and with limited resources
and capacity, and that China’s domestic experience of
using experimentation in health system reforms has
relevance for other countries engaged in complex sys-
temic reforms, including health system reforms. In
addition, as China increasingly becomes a develop-
ment actor, and engages in overseas health program-
ming, it is likely to draw on its own reform
experience in assisting other countries. As Chinese agen-
cies increasingly engage in overseas health programming,
this will provide a test of the broader applicability of
Chinese-style experimental policy processes and their adap-
tation to new environments.
Global health and challenges of scaling up
The term ‘scale up’ has increasingly been used to
frame a set of challenges to implementing health in-
terventions and developing functioning health sys-
tems. In its core meaning, it refers to increasing the
“coverage of health interventions that have been
tested in pilot and experimental projects in order to
benefit more people and support policy and
programme development at a large or national scale”,
though it is often used more broadly to mean
increasing the geographical or population coverage of
an intervention, or increasing resources committed to
an intervention [7]. The language of scaling up has
also been applied in global health debates to
implementation in LMICs of interventions shown to
be successful elsewhere or to health systems strength-
ening. Paina and Peters [5] exemplify this use, includ-
ing delivery at scale of child health interventions,
promoting roll-out of anti-retroviral therapy, and
expanding access to core packages of health services
in LMICs as part of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Despite increased funding, and atten-
tion from policy makers and practitioners, attempts at
scale up in LMICs have had varied success, as shown
by limited success of interventions that have been
shown to be effective elsewhere [8] and failure of
many countries to achieve the health MDGs [5].
Recent research has argued that global health initia-
tives predominantly assume that technical interven-
tions tested in one place can be replicated at scale in
different contexts, and that most research on such
initiatives has been results-focused (e.g. focusing on
coverage rates and mortality) rather than on processes
of scaling up specific interventions in new contexts
[7, 9, 10]. Simultaneously, there is increasing attention
to the importance of context in implementation of
health interventions [11, 12], realization that there are
no universally applicable approaches to scale up of
health interventions [1, 2, 11] and that interventions
in different contexts, though called by the same
name, may in fact differ substantially [2]. This is lead-
ing to a realization that the process of implementation
(scale up) itself may be as important as the strategy
to be implemented, and increasing attention to
‘implementation research’ – research on processes of
implementation and how these affect programmes [4].
This presents a challenge to mainstream ideas of scale
up in its various forms, including how to apply
interventions that have been shown to be effective
elsewhere, and how to scale up experimental inter-
ventions and pilots to achieve greater population
coverage and health benefits. Researchers have
addressed the challenges of scale up in a range of
ways. I review prominent analyses, and argue: that
challenges of scale up are not simply challenges of
overcoming certain easily identifiable constraints
located within health systems, but that reforms to
health systems, especially in rapidly developing
countries, are embedded in, and involve, broader so-
cial, economic and institutional reforms; and that
many health system interventions, especially when
considered in context, show many features of ‘com-
plex systems’. Reforming such systems requires
approaches to change management that foster
innovation, adaptation and learning.
Constraints to scale up. Recent research has identi-
fied financial, infrastructure, human resource, and
medical supply constraints to scale up, as well as
constraints related to policy, institutional and organ-
isational structures and processes. Hanson et al. [8]
create a typology of constraints, identifying those
which are comparatively easily overcome through in-
creased spending, and those which are less so (e.g.
constraints linked to governance and government
capacity), and which require other approaches.1
Gericke et al. [13] argue that there is insufficient
consideration of the technical challenge of health
interventions in low resource contexts, and that
non-financial resources are major constraints to
scaling up. Other analyses discuss alternative
approaches to increasing coverage, intended to side--
step constraints to scale up through use of vertical
or single-issue programmes, which can be compara-
tively isolated from other elements of the health
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system, delivery through non-governmental organisa-
tions [7], and through partnership with the private
sector [14].
Fostering emergence in complex systems
An increasing number of analyses use complex adap-
tive systems (CAS) theories to reframe how scale up
of health interventions in LMICs should be under-
stood, and critique ‘blueprint’ implementation
approaches [5]. CAS deals analytically with systems in
which actions of any one agent, or group of agents,
change the environment of other agents, leading to
adaptive behaviours, self-organisation and learning,
and cascade effects with unpredictable and emergent
order [15]. This challenges linear understandings of
interventions and scale up [16, 17], compounded
when health systems are considered in political,
economic, social and institutional context [10], where
the challenge is not to specify an end point, but to
find a path to it [18]. Finding that path, where ‘what
works’ is not (fully) known in advance, involves
understanding and working through complex systems.
This section argues for placing emergence at the
centre of analysis of how to intervene in complex
systems.
Complex systems generate emergent order, “when
smaller entities on their own jointly contribute to or-
ganized behaviours as a collective, resulting in the
whole being greater and more complex than the sum
of the parts” [5]. This is important because, as re-
searchers, policy makers or implementers, most phe-
nomena we are interested in are emergent system
properties, whether that be a functioning economy in
which multiple firms interact within regulatory struc-
tures and with consumers to provide goods and ser-
vices [19], or a health system, in which innumerable
elements come together to provide appropriate and
affordable care. In order to accelerate and shape the
development of a functioning and equitable health
system, we must understand how the environment
can be made conducive for the emergence of
desirable self-organising complexity [20]. This means
asking process questions (‘how should we learn what
works in the current situation?’), as well as trying to
define best practice (‘what works?’). It requires
willingness to experiment and innovate, and to accept
that intervening in complex systems is challenging,
often does not produce hoped-for outcomes, and
requires that interventions (whether discrete
programmes or policy-driven systemic reforms) be
treated as learning processes, rather than implementa-
tion of fixed ‘blueprints’.
The remainder of this section summarises points
from analyses of intervening in CASs to support
discussion in the following section of how China has
attempted to stimulate, and learn from, policy
innovation, and the relevance of this to managing
challenging reforms in large and rapidly-changing
complex systems.
The following table synthesises a number of ap-
proaches drawn from health systems and development
studies literatures on intervening in complex systems.
This brings out commonalities in both literatures
around the need to:
– Scope system and dynamics and identify points for
intervention
– Experiment and encourage innovation and policy
pluralism
– Foster methodological pragmatism and appropriate
policy solutions
– Screen for, and learn from, policy innovations and
useful practices
– Promote rapid learning and diffusion of useful
practices, but allow flexibility during scale up
The table groups main points from a range of studies
that analyse approaches to intervening in complex sys-
tems. In line with the key theoretical point of this
section, these points are oriented towards an analysis
of approaches for fostering the emergence of order
in complex systems where highly-directed planning
is of limited value. The following points summarise
commonalities arising from the analysis presented in
Table 1. This analysis is used to inform the discus-
sion of Chinese approaches below.
1. The assumption underlying these approaches is
that planning is of limited use in complex
systems, and that desirable outcomes must be
fostered. This says nothing about the degree of
complexity of any given system, but is a
statement of principle. Not all interventions
should be considered complex in this sense, and
different interventions therefore present different
challenges.2
2. There is substantial consensus on the importance
of creating the conditions to allow change and to
stimulate innovation, rather than planning. A
range of incentive structures will be important,
and will likely be context-dependent.3 Many
experiments and innovations fail, and this
requires development of cultures of tolerance
for policy or implementation failure, and
developing incentive systems that are goal based,
rather than task-based. ‘Isomorphic mimicry’ [21]
refers to the danger of developing institutions
that look like those in, say, developed countries,
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but which are hollow or not useful due to poor
contextual fit.4
3. Analyses recognise the importance of finding
institutions that fit a given context, even if these
are less technically efficient than theoretically-
known best practices, rather than trying to
impose best practice solutions. This makes
sense if complex systems are judged to be
evolutionary – ensuring adaptation over time is
more important than maximising efficiency in the
short term [22].
4. ‘Positive deviance’ encapsulates a simple idea – in
any given cohort, there are likely to be better-than-
average practices. These deserve attention from
researchers and policy makers looking for ways to
foster positive changes.5 Such practices may be
‘naturally occurring’ and precede intervention, or
they may result from intervention where the
Table 1 Key features of analyses of intervening in complex systems
Requirements/approaches Core principles
1. Scope system and dynamics; Identify stakeholders
and critical change points for intervention
- Attempt to identify key stakeholders, networks and ‘critical points for change’ in advance
of reforms [5], but be ready to learn rapidly about system dynamics and adjust as
reforms are implemented
- Make use of tools such as scenario planning and agent-based models to identify CAS
phenomena, attempt to anticipate changes and guide interventions [5], but be prepared
to adapt
- Engage multiple stakeholder groups in conceptualising and planning interventions to help
to capture dispersed understandings of system complexity [68]
2. Experiment and encourage innovation and policy
pluralism
- ‘Plan for unpredictability’: create conditions for change, rather than trying to directly engineer
change; allow flexible implementation by implementing units (sub-national governments,
departments and others) over rigid adherence to initially-conceived plans [5]
- Use experimental policy frameworks to stimulate systemic innovation; allow and encourage
trial and error by implementing units and tolerate implementation failure within reasonable
bounds [23]
- Use incentive systems that incentivise achievement of agreed goals (however these are
achieved) over carrying out of specific processes as a way to encourage pragmatic problem
solving and foster emergence of multiple policy solutions [23]
- Directly experiment and contrast multiple approaches where needed and/or where
fostering dispersed innovation is failing to find workable policy solutions [69]
3. Foster methodological pragmatism and appropriate
policy solutions
- Encourage methodological pragmatism and pluralism in problem solving by implementing
units over preconceived approaches (fit solutions to problems; not problems to solutions)
[70]; recognise that there may be multiple different solutions to a given problem or
multiple practices; accept diversity in policy solutions adopted by implementing units
- Look for policy solutions that are contextually appropriate and show ‘fit’ with the
environment, rather than getting hung up on ‘best practice’ solutions; recognise that
apparently technically second best approaches may function as ‘stepping-stone’ policies,
may promote system adaptation, and can be improved on in subsequent rounds
of reform [71]
- Avoid ‘isomorphic mimicry’, or practices that mimic supposed best practice, but have little
substance [70]
4. Screen for, and learn from, policy innovations and
useful practices
- Accept that in a CAS, solutions to problems must be discovered, and that there are limits
to ex ante design [72]; decrease reliance on planning and ex-ante analysis, and increase
monitoring, learning and
adaptation during experimentation-implementation [73]
- Incorporate multiple types of evaluation to capitalise on emerging understanding of
intervention processes and effects during roll out [68]
- Screen for ‘positive deviance’, or naturally occurring useful practices and emerging
innovations, and encourage dissemination of these through appropriate ‘fitness functions’
that can promote adaptive learning while discouraging inappropriate practices
- Promote appropriate and replicable (though not necessarily optimally efficient) policy
innovations over optimally efficient policy solutions that will be hard to replicate [74, 75]
5. Promote rapid learning and diffusion of useful
practices, but allow flexibility during scale up
- Carry out iterative programming / reforms; promote rapid learning, and ‘fail fast’ – directly
terminate failing or inappropriate practices or allow implementing units a degree of
discretion over this [23]
- Make use of diagnostic tools to analyse staging of reforms and think through the process
of removal successive binding constraints to reform [21]; use such tools to help sequence
reforms, but recognise that variation in starting points and conditions will lead to
implementing jurisdictions or units simultaneously occupying different stages of reform
trajectories
- Proactively propagate and support useful policy innovations, but be wary of imposing
one-size-fits-all policy solutions during scale up [10]
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parameters are wide enough to foster a range of
approaches and innovation of the part of
implementing units.
5. Interventions in complex systems function as probes
– they generate information on the nature and
functioning of the system that can be used to inform
subsequent intervention [23]. A ‘failed’ intervention
may therefore be useful for the information it
provides, though failing reforms should be
discontinued where appropriate.
6. Fostering dispersed innovation is methodologically
distinct from managed experimentation, though the
aims are similar – how to capture dispersed
initiative and uncover useful ways of working?
Screening useful practices from a mass of policy
experience requires developing fitness functions that
can promote good (‘fit’) practices and discourage
inappropriate ones [24]. Screening may be simple
(e.g. using trusted research institutions to carry out
evaluations of emerging practices), or more
decentred and organic.
7. In evolutionary systems, when promoting emulation
of policy solutions, replicability is more important
than technical efficiency (this mirrors point 3,
above). Enforcing standardisation during roll out
may have the same kinds of drawbacks as enforcing
one-size-fits-all policy implementation.
8. None of the analyses discussed here specifically
addresses the normative question of what
should be considered desirable or takes that
into account in discussion of complex systems
and fostering emergence, though most analyses
have an implicit value orientation. I return to
this below.
The points presented here derive from a substantial,
but scattered literature, and could easily be extended;
however, they provide a starting point for analysis of a
distinct Chinese approach to health reforms in the next
section.
Understanding experimentation in China’s health
reforms
Since the beginning of reforms in the late 1970s, and
the move away from a state-dominated and planned
economy, China has been transformed from a poor
country, in which incomes of most of the population
stood below the global median, to a middle-income
country, raising hundreds of millions out of poverty
in the process [25]. Latterly, it has actively developed
social protection systems, including rural and urban
health financing schemes, pensions for rural and
urban populations, and others. China’s approach to
reform has been government-led and unorthodox.
The speed of development, and the complexity and
interconnectedness of reforms have led many to talk
of a specific ‘Chinese model’ of development [26].
Experimental policy making and policy innovation are
part of the policy toolbox, though most analyses have
discussed experimental policy making in economic
reform and similar areas, rather than health or social
policy. This section argues that China’s health system
development has relied substantially on a range of
approaches to policy making, implementation, and
policy learning that can be broadly classified as ex-
perimental. The discussion that follows is not ex-
haustive: health reforms have been underway for
more than 20 years, and reforms are ongoing both in
the health system itself, and in the larger institutional-
bureaucratic system. It is also not to say that Chinese
approaches are optimally efficient, or that they are
necessarily effective (or are used well), but this sec-
tion argues that China’s approaches (China displays
not one form of experimental policy making, but a
range of approaches that fall under this umbrella)
provide real-world examples of the use of experimen-
tal reform management techniques in reforming com-
plex systems, and that these deserve attention from
researchers and policy makers concerned with scale
up of health interventions.
Complexity in China’s health reforms
As argued above, health systems should be analysed
in their social, economic and institutional context.
Seen in this way, Chinese health system reforms show
a high degree of complexity. While this is hard to
capture overall, at least the following points are
highly salient:
– The health ministry sits at the apex of a
hierarchical bureaucratic system and makes
policies that guide the actions of multiple tiers of
lower level government, but health policy exists
within a broad ecology of policy making
involving many institutional actors and interests.6
Policy making responsibility is distributed, and
many policies with direct relevance for health
agencies, healthcare providers, etc., are the
responsibility of other parts of government.
Actions of a range of other government and
institutional actors may have an impact on those
of health agencies. Central government
coordination groups are often set up at times of
intense reform activity to coordinate ministry
interests and link mandates.
– Central government policy must be sufficiently
broad to be implementable in jurisdictions
(principally cities and rural counties, henceforth:
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counties)7 that vary across many parameters,
including levels of economic development, financial
and human resources, population health,
geographical, environmental, socio-cultural and
spatial factors. Equally, counties’ bureaucratic and
institutional structures differ, reflecting naturally
occurring variation in the political economy, and the
legacy of past restructuring processes (both within
and outside the health system) that have been
implemented differently, or to different degrees, in
different places. The importance of non-state actors
(including civil society and commercial interests)
differs by place.
– The number of counties and the range of
parameters across which variation may occur create
great information asymmetry for central ministries
and even provincial governments, and data able to
inform intervention are often unavailable, or are
limited, before the launch of a given reform. The
results of interventions across a range of counties
with different conditions and starting points are
hard to foresee and the possibility of divergent
outcomes in different counties, or over time, is high.
The interactions between reforms in the health
system and other social, administrative, economic,
and environmental systems are harder to predict,
especially given ongoing and rapid change in almost
all such systems, an increasing amount of which falls
outside the direct influence of government, as the
society and economy are liberalised. Rapid change in
all these areas creates challenges for predicting the
effects of any given intervention.
Since the early 2000s, China has embarked on a
process of rebuilding a functioning health system, fol-
lowing the partial dismantling of its pre-reform system,
Table 2 Indicative typology of China’s experimental health policy processes
Indicative type Salient features
Type I: Managed piloting/policy trialling - Direct experimentation, allowing trialling of targeted interventions in which pilots are
relatively closely managed with the intention of trialling specific approaches to defined
policy problem; local governments have a relatively low degree of discretion
- Technical support to implementing units is often provided by research institutes,
academics, and/or international agencies; local governments retain discretion in concrete
management approaches adopted and in timing, etc., in an attempt to find approaches
with contextual fit
- Pilots may be in advance of the national (or provincial) policy agenda, and have an
agenda setting function, or may fall within existing policy frameworks and form part of
ongoing reforms and may provide lessons of supra-local or systemic significance
- Screening and learning: scale up of practices deemed useful may or may not take place;
may be directed by higher levels of government (frequently through one size doesn’t fit
all scale up) or may be relatively organic
Type II: Experimental policy frameworks; local
government purposive reforms
- Framework policy is set by central or provincial government, giving local governments
or other implementing units limited discretion between relatively defined implementation
choices; leads to multiple practices
- Implementing counties often have little expert support or technical assistance, though
better-resourced jurisdictions may have support from national or sub-national research
institutions, or occasionally external TA through international programmes; space for
pragmatic problem solving and emergence of ‘appropriate’ approaches with contextual fit
- Local government reforms fall within the ‘implementation’ phase of the policy cycle; may
provide lessons of supra-local or systemic significance
- Screening and learning: as above
Type III: Open policy frameworks; local government
adaptive innovation and learning by doing
- ‘Open’ policy frameworks are used by central government, allowing space for broad
local discretion in implementation and learning by doing and emergence of multiple
practices11
- Often little expert support – as above; space for pragmatic problem solving and
emergence of ‘appropriate’ approaches with contextual fit
- Local government innovation falls within the ‘implementation’ phase of the policy
cycle; may provide lessons of supra-local or systemic significance
- Screening and learning: as above
Type IV: Decentralised implementation; range of
policy practices
- Decentralised policy making in the absence of national standardisation can produce
a range of policy practices
- Often little expert support – as above; space for pragmatic problem solving and
emergence of ‘appropriate’ approaches with contextual fit
- May fall in multiple phases of policy cycle; may provide lessons of supra-local or
systemic significance
- Screening and learning: as above
11Open’ policy frameworks deliberately allow implementers discretion in the co-construction of reforms [76]. Much Chinese policy is of this type, though by no
means all local implementers are proactive innovators or engaged in learning by doing, and much foot dragging [77] and mis-communication also [78] exist, while
financial resources and prior policy design may be inadequate [42].
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increasing marketisation of many health services, and
worsening access and equity [27, 28]. Since the early
2000s, waves of reforms have focused on a wide range of
areas, including launching of rural and urban health in-
surance programmes to underpin population health
seeking, increasing government health spending and,
under the aegis of the 2009 new health reform package,
expanding insurance coverage, establishing a national es-
sential medicines system, improving primary care and
improving availability of public health services, and
piloting public hospital reforms [29]. The above changes
have been accompanied by vast transformations of
China’s economy, infrastructure, population, and society.
As above, the starting point of much scale up
literature is an intervention that is thought to merit ap-
plication at greater scale, and this literature increasingly
points to the importance of context and an
understanding of complexity in ensuring successful roll
out. On any possible interpretation, building a function-
ing health system in China requires dealing with com-
plex, high speed and intersecting reforms across a wide
geographic area in which the starting points of imple-
menting counties are hard to know, and in which the re-
sults of reforms are hard to accurately predict. The
following sections discuss Chinese thinking about ex-
perimental policy development, and a range of experi-
mental management techniques visible in China’s health
reforms.
Central control and local discretion
In China, local experimentation as a tool for policy de-
velopment dates to before the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and was pio-
neered by Chinese communist party (CCP) cadres as a
way to deal with a range of priority issues, including
land reform and organising agricultural production. For
the CCP, this was a pragmatic approach to reforms
under conditions of scarcity of resources and expertise
and in an environment characterised by extreme vari-
ation in conditions. Approaches trialled in the 1920s and
30s were progressively codified as party/government
working methods and as an identifiable administrative
vocabulary of reform management [30]. Such pragmatic
approaches to reform management have existed in ten-
sion with more command-oriented approaches over the
history of the PRC, but have been frequently been
stressed in China’s ‘reform’ era, starting in the 1970s,
through use of experimental zones and experimental
policies. Such deliberate experimentalism coexists with
increasing discretion within the government system
through decentralisation of administrative authority and
creating incentives for local governments to pursue re-
forms (such as in economic development) that have
system-wide benefits [31]. A number of factors underlie
Chinese thinking on this, not least the difficulty of
adopting one-size-fits-all solutions in a country of con-
tinental size and encompassing very great variation. In-
evitably, the range of dynamics created by policy
approaches that include direct experimentation as well
as decentralisation mean that a range of patterns of
learning exist, from (in some cases) directed scale up of
relatively managed experiments to more organic dissem-
ination of scattergun innovation processes tied to decen-
tralisation [32].
In many policy areas, central government leaves sub-
stantial space to sub-national governments within an
overall policy framework and direction set by central
government, creating a ‘paradox’ of central control and
sub-national space for discretion and initiative: while
central government controls the policy agenda, the
personnel system, much resource allocation, and ap-
proval for large projects, sub-national units have discre-
tion and space for local initiative, which can support
policy innovation [33]. This is frequently rationalised
with reference to common understandings of the ‘spirit’
of policy:
“China is a unitary polity. Sub-national government
must obey central government, and must carry out
reform under the unified arrangement and direction
of the centre. [However] central institutions and pol-
icy give local government a lot of space for exercising
initiative. Acting according to the requirements of the
centre, and under the unified leadership of the centre,
doesn’t mean blindly or mechanically acting according
to the instructions of superior levels [of government].
Rather, each place can […] in line with their local
conditions, experiment boldly according to the spirit
of central [policy]” [34].
This framing of local government flexible imple-
mentation and innovation within the overall spirit of
central policy pre-dates the establishment of the PRC.
The paradigmatic statement of this comes from Mao
Zedong:
“legislative powers are all vested in the central
authorities. But, provided that the policies of the
central authorities are not violated, the local author-
ities may work out rules, regulations and measures in
the light of their specific conditions and the needs of
their work […] We want both unity and particularity.
[I]t is imperative to have a strong and unified central
leadership and unified planning and discipline
throughout the country […] At the same time, it is
essential to bring the initiative of the local authorities
into full play and let each locality enjoy the particu-
larity suited to its local conditions” [35].
This framing is tied to policy discourses which empha-
sise the importance of ‘implementing according to local
conditions’ (yin di zhi yi), and the impossibility of
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adopting ‘one size fits all’ (yi dao qie) policy that can be
summarised as a “deep-seated one-size-does-not-fit-all
pragmatism” [36]. Central leaders and policy makers fre-
quently express rhetorical commitment to sub-national
policy adaptation, experimentation and innovation,8
underpinned by a policy discourse that allows signalling
of emergent practices. This discourse of local particular-
ity is shared by many actors within the policy commu-
nity, including sub-national officials, think tank
researchers and academics,9 and one aspect of China’s
reform process has been to create norms of tolerance of
variant sub-national policy practices that can allow ini-
tiative and risk taking by local governments for systemic
benefit [31].
What does experimentation look like?
Multiple forms of activity should be considered under
the umbrella of ‘experimentation’ in Chinese policy de-
velopment. According to Heilmann [37, 38], Chinese
central government supports managed pilots for the ex-
ploration of novel policy options intended to support
central decision making, but other analyses have shown
widespread policy ‘tinkering’, in which sub-national gov-
ernments carry out broad low-level experimentation on
a range of issues under loose policy frameworks [39]. In
most cases, experimentation is not controlled piloting,
but distributed problem solving under overarching na-
tional policy frameworks, often signalled by terms
such as ‘innovation’ [40, 41]. This fits closely with the
typology of approaches to intervening in complex sys-
tems to promote the emergence of desirable order
discussed in Fostering emergence in complex systems
and Table 1. Experimental policy making of some
form exists in many policy areas, including health
programming [36, 42–44].
This section develops an indicative typology of forms
of experimental policy making, implementation and
innovation. This is a heuristic device, whose aim is to in-
dicate the breadth of activity that should be considered
under this rubric, to show commonalities with the ana-
lysis, above, of programming under conditions of com-
plexity, and to raise the question of the relevance of
such approaches for researchers and policy makers con-
cerned with scale up of health interventions (Table 2).
A brief overview of development of China’s rural
health insurance scheme, the New Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NCMS), illustrates a number of these aspects.
A section on Important features and limitations, below,
extracts distinctive features from this narrative and
frames them in the context of the analysis provided in
the section on fostering emergence in complex systems.
– Following the decline and collapse of China’s
pre-reform rural health insurance, a number of
pilots were run in the 1990s and onwards, both
managed pilots, involving a substantial degree of
expert design or oversight [Type I] [45], and
pilots in which sub-national jurisdictions were
granted a degree of autonomy to decide their
own reforms [Type III] [46]. Pilots often had
support from Chinese and foreign researchers and
international agencies, aiming to provide a model
for a new insurance scheme. While lessons were
learned about possible modes of structuring a new
rural insurance scheme, and system dynamics, these
failed to have substantial policy impact until the
opening of a policy window in the early 2000s [47].
Lessons from these early pilots were, to an extent,
taken into account in establishing a national ‘pilot’
scheme [36, 48].
– The national pilot scheme initially gave around
300 local governments a range of implementation
choices [49, 50] in scheme design [Type II],
though much sub-national management was
unscripted trial and error within the overall
parameters of the scheme [Type III]. Incomplete
dismantling of the previous rural health insurance
programme from the 1980s onwards meant that
some counties retained insurance schemes [Type
IV], while variation in economic, institutional and
political economic factors provided varying
starting points for reforms in different locations
[Type IV].
– This range of experimental processes produced a
wide range of approaches and practices of varying
degrees of local and supra-local usefulness, as well as
some approaches deemed illegitimate. Efforts were
made to learn from this scattergun implementation
experience, to disseminate lessons from it in reports
and guidelines [51, 52], and to use it in codification
of policy. In many areas, sub-national governments
(counties and provinces) made concrete policy
which was then learnt from and/or codified in
provincial or national regulations, in a kind of policy
‘crowd sourcing’ [44].
– Even following roll out, much scheme
management remained under-institutionalised
[53], and sub-national governments engaged in
much learning by doing [Type III], figuring out
how to manage a complex insurance scheme, and
to develop suitable management arrangements
that are contextually appropriate as they went
along, often with little support. Such local
experimentation / innovation underpins ongoing
system reform and resilience, is often widely
reported, and may be the focus of debate within
the policy community, but may or may not have
much policy impact or be codified [54].
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– Faced with specific management problems, national
and provincial policy makers, research institutes and
international agencies commissioned or carried out
managed pilots [Type I] or made use of
experimental policy frameworks [Type II] in an
attempt to develop policy models with broad
applicability, for example in developing functioning
provider payment systems [55, 56]. Some such
models were propagated widely, but policy impact is
often limited and/or hard to show.
– Sub-national governments carried out a range of
reforms within the overall parameters of the
scheme, whether through proactive policy
entrepreneurship or through pressure to implement
the scheme [Type III], exploring different scheme
management problems, including fundraising
approaches, cost control measures, payment
reforms, linking rural and urban schemes, extending
the scheme to rural-to-urban migrants, and similar.
This scattergun approach produces a wide range of
results, of varying degrees of usefulness. National,
city and provincial policy makers, as well as
academics and researchers, made use of a range of
methods (site visits, meetings, evaluations, etc.) to
identify and propagate potentially useful practices –
a form of screening for, and learning from, positive
deviance – and there is often substantial debate over
reforms and specific practices, though propagation is
often limited.
Important features (and limitations)
The above is a sketch of a highly complex reform
process run across almost three thousand implementing
counties over the course of approximately two decades,
from small scale managed pilots preceding national
policy backing, to the launch of a loosely-articulated
piloting process in the early 2000s, nationwide roll out,
and ongoing adaptive management, problem solving,
learning by doing, and increasing codification over time,
including linking of the rural health insurance scheme
with urban insurance schemes [57].10 The case pre-
sented here illustrates very many, if not most of, the ap-
proaches to managing for the emergence of order in
complex systems described from the literature in Foster-
ing emergence in complex systems. The following fea-
tures are striking:
– Central government controls the overall policy
agenda and direction of reform, sets implementation
targets for local governments (frontline
implementers of the national scheme), and has
oversight of scheme financing. Coexisting with
this control, many implementation parameters
are only broadly defined, and sub-national
governments act as problem solvers and change
managers, rather than straightforward implementers
of policy. Central government encourages and
tolerates a wide range of policy practices.
Variation between implementing counties is
substantial, and a wide range of policy practices
exists at any one time.
– Sub-national reforms frequently ‘die’ or are
discontinued, in their place of origin, whether
because they are deemed unsuccessful, or because
of changes in local leadership, incentives or
conditions [58]. On the other hand, some
sub-national reforms show patterns of iterative
learning and deepening [59].
– While variation creates substantial information
asymmetry and difficulties for learning, multiple
patterns of policy learning exist, from ‘vertical’
codification of policy practices deemed useful in
provincial or national policy, through to
relatively organic spread through a range of
‘informational infrastructures’ [60], including
meetings, trainings, organised site visits,
exchange of documentation, etc. Reforms are
accompanied by substantial information flows,
through policies, ministry bulletins, media, etc.
Policy champions and trusted intermediaries,
such as government research institutes, may be
important in promoting certain sub-national
practices.
– Variation across jurisdictions can occur along
multiple dimension; scale up inevitably
encounters multiple contexts and requires
ongoing policy adaptation. Codification of diverse
policy practices often occurs late in the policy
cycle, maintaining space for sub-national
flexibility and one-size-doesn’t-fit-all scale up.
Even where codification occurs, reforms are often
‘under-institutionalised’ [53].
– There are many criticisms of such approaches to
policy development [61]. This is not an optimally
efficient approach to policy development: many
pilots fail to have substantial impact, while many
policy innovations fall by the wayside or fail to
be propagated [50]. Specific policy innovations
are rarely ‘best practice’, but the system can
produce ‘appropriate’ solutions that show
contextual fit, and underpin ongoing system
adaptation [44]. Overall, there is space for policy
learning to take place and for system adaptation
over time.
As discussed above, the above dynamics are visible
in a range of reform areas, in health and elsewhere,
and a substantial body of Chinese analysis is devoted
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to profiling potentially useful or important sub-
national reforms.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed scale up in global health
from the point of view of complex adaptive systems
and has synthesised strategies for engaging in com-
plex systems. It has argued that emergence should be
the key feature of interest for policy- and
intervention-focused researchers, and that the ques-
tion of how to foster desirable emergent system prop-
erties is core to a ‘complex systems approach’ to
health system change, and hence to scale up in global
health in complex contexts. The paper argues that
China’s management of change shows many features
that the literature tells us are necessary to manage-
ment of change in complex systems, and presents a
case study showing the operation of these in one area
of China’s ongoing health reforms.
Use of China as a case does not imply that ap-
proaches such as these to health system development
are a panacea; they are not. China’s reform manage-
ment, including management of experimental reforms
and promotion of innovation, suffers from many
problems, not least low efficiency and relatively
limited popular accountability. The particular ‘imple-
mentation conjuncture’ of sub-national governments
as well as, in many cases, limited local government
capacity and finances, often influence sub-national
behaviour [44]. Though this is by no means unique to
China, reforms which challenge the interests of
powerful groups (such as hospitals) [24], or which pit
one government ministry against another, are likely to
be harder to implement – and are likely to be less
promising areas for fostering experimentation and
innovation in the service of complex reforms – than
those that don’t. Overall, evolutionary approaches to
economic (or other) development caution that alloca-
tive efficiency may be low in such systems, but that
this may be a price to pay for adaptation over time
[32]. While China’s health system continues to have
many problems, progress is being made in ensuring
broad population access and reforms continue in
many areas.
China’s adoption of pragmatic, experimental ap-
proaches to reform management appears to have been
the result of a specific conjuncture, and of the diffi-
culty of managing a country of China’s size and het-
erogeneity. These approaches have been developed
over time and, to an extent at least, codified. While
the institutional foundations of China’s experimental-
innovative approach to reform are receiving increasing
attention [6, 38], there remain questions about its in-
stitutional basis. This article has shown how Chinese
health system reform processes show a lot of the fea-
tures stressed in the literature for managing change
in complex systems through fostering dispersed ex-
perimentation and innovation, screening and learning
from decentralised experimental processes, and
through use of appropriate transitional institutions in
ongoing and evolutionary reform processes. Globally,
there remain many questions about how concretely to
manage reforms in complex systems, particularly how
to ‘manage for emergence’. Many debates on the fos-
tering and propagation of innovation in social policy
originate in developed countries [62–64], and it is in-
creasingly clear that institutions are very context-spe-
cific, making necessary context-specific approaches to
reform. This can be argued to be the case for China
[65], but also in health systems development [4].
Areas such as global health and international develop-
ment, which are increasingly framing key questions in
terms of complex and adaptive systems, face ques-
tions around the institutions needed to foster
innovation and maintain adaption for the benefit of a
hoped-for future, emergent, state, whether in eco-
nomic or market development or in health or social
policy. Despite the limitations of the Chinese case, it
should be considered a reference point with relevance
for policy makers and policy-focused researchers else-
where for understanding processes of managing for
emergence in complex systems.
How to ensure that incentives create beneficial in-
novations or ensure the desired direction of reforms,
and how to develop risk-tolerant implementation
cultures [31] are substantial challenges in this kind of
approach. Alongside the fostering of innovation,
screening and evaluation present substantial
challenges in complex systems. How to create mecha-
nisms that can generate credible information for pol-
icy makers and implementers about the impacts of
interventions where change is rapid, where starting
points of most implementing jurisdictions vary in
unknowable ways, and where interactions are
complex, is a formidable task, though one in which
China has some experience [66]. This remains under-
theorised but is a necessary part of the experimenters’
toolkit [67].
Endnotes
1Some constraints, such as absorptive capacity or
exchange rate distortions due to aid inflows, are
characteristic of aid programmes, and not solely
constraints linked to health interventions [7].
2Various typologies exist for classifying systems as
simple, complicated, complex (and sometimes
chaotic) [20, 79].
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3On fostering innovation in public services see [61]
and in health services [32].
4Wild et al. discuss the dangers of isomorphic mimicry,
particularly in aid-dependent settings, where there is
pressure to adopt supposed best practices, independent of
their fit with local context.
5Use of the term ‘positive deviance’ in development
studies originates with research on nutrition practices in
poor communities in Vietnam [74].
6There are five tiers of government below the centre:
provinces and municipalities; prefecture-level cities;
counties and county-level cities; townships and towns;
and villages and/or street-level urban jurisdictions.
7Counties and county-level cities are the lowest level
of administration with the full complement of govern-
ment agencies, reflecting central ministries and other
agencies. China has almost 3000 county-level adminis-
trative jurisdictions.
8Two examples from Wu Yi, then Vice Premier of
China, in relation to development of rural health
insurance, a national policy process initiated in the early
2000s, illustrate this use: “the difference in conditions
between different rural areas is very large, and it is
impossible to adopt a one size fits all policy; the main
thing is for each area to experiment in the process of
implementation in line with local conditions” [80], and
“We use a method in which the centre sets the
principles of policy and localities concretely organise
implementable policy; we encourage each locality to
experiment and innovate” [81].
9Fieldwork carried out by the author on county-level
policy innovation in the development of China’s rural
health insurance system found common rationalisations
of policy flexibility and leeway in implementation between
central rhetoric and sub-national governments (province,
city and county).
10China’s administration is split between rural and
urban areas. Urban benefit systems have consistently
been more generous than rural ones.
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